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Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit 
Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural  
Duty of Consideration to Protect  
Non-Shareholder Interests  
Ian Kanig* 
Corporations are beholden to a deeply flawed system of corporate governance known as 
shareholder wealth maximization. This norm dictates that corporations optimize profits 
at all costs to compensate equity investors for their continued exposure to risk. Other 
stakeholders in the corporate enterprise, like employees and consumers, are owed nothing 
outside of the contractual relationships they might possess, while the public at large is 
owed nothing at all. Because courts continue to vigorously enforce this norm, 
corporations are largely excluded from providing public goods and services, while 
simultaneously incentivized to push harmful production costs onto communities and the 
environment. To cope with this outcome, disparate actors like non-profit organizations, 
the state, and consumers have intervened in the marketplace, with questionable effect. 
While it may be too late to do away with the shareholder wealth maximization system in 
traditional corporate entities, there is an alternative corporate structure that entrepreneurs 
and consumers can and should utilize to make capitalism work for the public good. 
 
This Note analyzes how the structure of the benefit corporation reunites profit seeking 
and the promotion of the public good in a single, private business entity. The benefit 
corporation mandates a hybrid purpose: profit and “material positive impact on society 
and the environment.” In short, benefit corporations aspire to the rallying cry of the 
“social entrepreneur”—to do well while doing good. Critics, however, question the 
substantive enforcement mechanism of the benefit corporation, a third-party auditing 
standard that they self-apply to evaluate whether they are effectively providing for the 
public good. This Note concurs, but proposes a statutory construction and litigation 
strategy that courts and plaintiffs can apply to ensure that benefit corporations do not 
shirk their duty to the public. Through the express private right of action known as the 
“benefit enforcement proceeding,” this Note contends that shareholders and dissenting 
directors can and should seek injunctive relief for breaches of the procedural “duty of 
consideration of non-shareholder interests” by the corporation and its board of directors. 
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Introduction—The Cautionary Tale of Apple and Foxconn 
Apple Incorporated, the ubiquitous computer-electronics firm, 
became the subject of intense public scrutiny in January 2012 after 
investigative reports painted a disturbing picture of business practices at 
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the manufacturing facilities of one of its primary Chinese suppliers, 
Foxconn Technology.1 Labor conditions were so “morally repugnant”2 
that 150 workers had threatened to commit “mass suicide” unless 
Foxconn made changes.3 A subsequent investigation by The New York 
Times revealed that Foxconn forced its employees to work “excessive 
overtime, in some cases seven days a week,” their legs swelling until they 
could hardly walk.4 Some of these laborers were college educated, while 
others were only children.5 Packed into “cockroach-infested,”6 “crowded 
dorms” during off-hours, workers returned to the factories to confront 
Orwellian signs on the wall that warned, “Work hard on the job today or 
work hard to find a job tomorrow.”7 Industrial explosions had ripped 
through multiple iPad factories, killing several and injuring dozens more.8 
Environmental protection protocols—voluntarily in place for the 
protection of local communities—were ignored or fraudulently bypassed 
by Foxconn, resulting in the disposal of “hazardous waste” in unregulated 
sites.9 Although Apple was quick to respond to the resulting public 
relations crisis, sending its Chief Executive Officer Timothy D. Cook to 
China to personally visit Foxconn’s iPhone manufacturing plant,10 this 
was not the first time defects in Foxconn’s labor practices were brought 
to Apple’s attention.11 
Despite Apple’s promulgation of a socially responsible “code of 
conduct” that mandates fair treatment for workers and responsible 
environmental protocol in its supply chain, the company first encountered 
a series of problems with its Chinese manufacturers, similar to those 
described above, in 2005.12 Executives at Apple were genuinely “shocked,” 
 
 1. See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad, N.Y. 
Times (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-
human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting Foxconn is the largest exporter 
operating in China, manufacturing over 40% of the world’s consumer electronics and employing over 
1.2 million people). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Malcolm Moore, ‘Mass Suicide’ Protest at Apple Manufacturer Foxconn Factory, Telegraph 
(Jan. 11, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9006988/Mass-suicide-
protest-at-Apple-manufacturer-Foxconn-factory.html. 
 4. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Susan Adams, Apple’s New Foxconn Embarrassment, Forbes (Sept. 12, 2012, 2:38 PM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/09/12/apples-new-foxconn-embarrassment. 
 7. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Kevin Drew, Apple’s Chief Visits iPhone Factory in China, N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/technology/apples-chief-timothy-cook-visits-foxconn-factory.html. 
 11. Adams, supra note 6; see The Stark Reality of iPod’s Chinese Factories, MailOnline (Aug. 18, 
2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-401234/The-stark-reality-iPods-Chinese-factories.html 
(reporting abuses at the Foxconn factory in 2006).  
 12. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 1; see The Stark Reality, supra note 11 (reporting abuses at the 
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and the company conducted an extensive, multi-year internal auditing 
process, which in 2007 resulted in an “annual audit report” that detailed 
numerous, continued violations to Apple’s supply chain code of conduct, 
including findings of child labor.13 A third-party consortium composed of 
consulting firms and the World Bank subsequently approached Foxconn, 
with Apple’s knowledge, about putting in place programs to increase 
worker welfare at Foxconn’s manufacturing facilities.14 But negotiations 
over reforms broke down during consideration of various proposed 
safety nets.15 Fourteen Foxconn employees subsequently committed 
suicide by leaping to their deaths,16 which, in a cruel twist of irony, 
Foxconn responded to by installing physical safety nets.17 After the most 
recent wave of negative publicity crashed over American consumers, 
however, Apple and Foxconn publicly “pledged to sharply curtail 
working hours and significantly increase wages inside Chinese plants 
making electronic products for Apple and others.”18 Unfortunately, their 
pledge was merely a portent of the pitfalls that lay ahead. 
As part of Apple’s promise to revamp labor practices in their global 
supply chain, Apple became the first computer-electronics firm to join 
the Fair Labor Association (“FLA”).19 The FLA is a consortium of 
universities, civil-society organizations, and other “socially responsible 
companies” that was founded in 1999 in order to protect workers’ rights 
on an international scale by promoting a “multi-stakeholder approach” 
to corporate governance.20 The FLA functions as an external auditor, 
setting labor standards through its own code of conduct,21 monitoring and 
 
Foxconn factory in 2006). 
 13. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. James Pomfret et al., Foxconn Worker Plunges to Death at China Plant: Report, Reuters 
(Nov. 5, 2010, 6:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-china-foxconn-death-
idUSTRE6A41M920101105. 
 17. Moore, supra note 3. 
 18. Charles Duhigg & Steven Greenhouse, Electronic Giant Vowing Reforms in China Plants, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/business/apple-supplier-in-china-pledges-
changes-in-working-conditions.html?pagewanted=all.  
 19. Apple Joins FLA, Fair Labor Ass’n (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/ 
apple-joins-fla; see David Barboza & Charles Duhigg, China Contractor Again Faces Labor Issue on 
iPhones, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/technology/foxconn-said-to-
use-forced-student-labor-to-make-iphones.html?pagewanted=all.  
 20. Protecting Workers’ Rights Worldwide, Fair Labor Ass’n, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). The “multi-stakeholder approach,” a theory of corporate governance that 
demands organizations consider not only shareholders, but also employees, surrounding communities, 
and the environment in their decisionmaking, is detailed in Parts II and III of this Note. 
 21. Labor Standards, Fair Labor Ass’n, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/labor-standards (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2013). FLA’s Code of Conduct is “based on International Labour Organization’s 
standards and internationally accepted good labor practices.” Id. The code outlines “Ten Principles of 
Fair Labor and Responsible Sourcing,” which include: an employment relationship that safeguards 
minimum labor standards; nondiscrimination; a ban on harassment and abuse; a ban on forced labor; a 
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reporting on member companies, and supporting voluntary compliance 
efforts.22 The consortium purports to distinguish itself from conventional 
auditors by identifying the systemic causes of sub-standard labor practices 
and recommending sustainable treatments, not emergency-room triage.23 
To diagnose Apple and Foxconn, the FLA conducted on-site audits of 
several of the Foxconn sites where Apple products are manufactured.24 
The FLA’s President and Chief Executive Officer, Auret von Heerden, 
personally attended those initial inspections and declared, to a skeptical 
press, that Foxconn’s “facilities are first-class” and “Foxconn is really not 
a sweatshop.”25 Several months later, the FLA released a two-and-a-half-
page progress-verification report commending Foxconn’s numerous 
successes at reducing employees’ hours and improving working 
conditions.26 The FLA made clear, however, that Foxconn still needed to 
hire “tens of thousands of extra workers” to ensure that these reforms 
were permanently institutionalized and not swept aside by impending 
market demands.27 
Apple and Foxconn now faced a serious dilemma. Implementing the 
FLA’s reforms had curtailed Foxconn’s production capabilities, which 
were no longer sufficient to maintain Apple’s production schedule for the 
highly anticipated and soon-to-be-released iPhone 5.28 Consumers had pre-
ordered the new devices in unparalleled numbers.29 Investors carefully 
scrutinized the marketplace for signs that Apple would fail to meet 
earnings expectations.30 With pressure mounting, Foxconn increased its 
 
ban on child labor; freedom of association; health, safety and environmental protections; restrictions 
on maximum hours; and minimum compensation. Id. 
 22. Our Methodology, Fair Labor Ass’n, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/our-methodology 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Fair Labor Association Launches Independent Investigation of Foxconn, Fair Labor Ass’n (Feb. 
13, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/fair-labor-association-launches-independent-investigation-
foxconn; see Barboza & Duhigg, supra note 19. 
 25. Steven Greenhouse, Early Praise in Inspection at Foxconn Brings Doubt, N.Y. Times (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/early-praise-in-foxconn-inspection-brings-doubt.html. 
 26. See Foxconn Verification Status Report, Fair Labor Ass’n (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www. 
fairlabor.org/report/foxconn-remediation-verification; Fair Labor Association Finds Progress at Apple 
Supplier Foxconn, Fair Labor Ass’n (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/press-release/foxconn_ 
verification_report. 
 27. Barboza & Duhigg, supra note 19. 
 28. See id. (noting the existence of labor shortages following the implementation of the FLA 
reforms). 
 29. Josh Lowensohn, Apple Says It’s ‘Blown Away’ by iPhone 5 Preorders, CNET (Sept. 14, 2012, 
2:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57513424-37/apple-says-its-blown-away-by-iphone-5-preorders. 
 30. Henry Blodget, In Case You Had Any Doubts About Where Apple’s Profit Comes from . . ., 
Business Insider (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/iphone-profit-2012-8 (“[T]he 
difference between a ‘hit’ and a ‘dud’ iPhone 5 would likely be hundreds of dollars per share.”); see 
Deborah Netburn, Latest Rumor Pegs Apple’s Debut of iPhone 5 in September, L.A. Times (July 24, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/24/business/la-fi-tn-iphone-5-coming-this-september-20120724 
(discussing rumored iPhone 5 release dates and their impact on Apple’s share value). 
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labor force—but almost certainly not in the manner that the FLA had 
desired. Droves of unpaid “interns,” who were students at nearby 
vocational schools, were put to work on Foxconn’s iPhone assembly lines 
against their will.31 Foxconn claimed that the students were free to leave, 
but interviews conducted by China Labor Watch, a Chinese labor 
advocacy organization, made it clear that the students “don’t want to work 
there—they want to learn.”32 Their teachers, however, informed them that 
if they did not work, they would not graduate.33 Foxconn had also hired 
large groups of migrant workers, who often traveled thousands of miles 
at their own expense only to arrive and discover that the terms of their 
employment had been drastically altered to their detriment.34 Tensions 
were high, frustration was building, and further deterioration of labor 
relations was imminent. 
On September 23, 2012, over one thousand workers at the Foxconn 
facility in Taiyuan, a large industrial city in central China where iPhone 
components are allegedly made, waged an uprising against Foxconn’s 
“security guards.”35 What Foxconn initially described as a large brawl 
between employees turned out to be a full-scale riot, and over five-
thousand police officers were dispatched to quell the disturbance.36 An 
online video purportedly showed police using a megaphone to address 
migrant workers, suggesting that the uprising was connected to their 
particular complaints.37 Foxconn repeatedly denied the extent of the 
disturbance and made sure to communicate that “no production facilities 
or equipment ha[d] been affected.”38 Two weeks later, between three and 
four thousand employees at the Foxconn facility in Zhengzhou went on 
strike, protesting increased quality-control standards put in place after 
consumer complaints about the iPhone 5.39 The FLA’s van Heerden met 
again with reporters for The New York Times and said that he was 
“concerned about these recent reports, and we’re following up.”40 In 
response to inquiries by Forbes, an “Apple spokesman declined to 
 
 31. Barboza & Duhigg, supra note 19. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. By the time The New York Times had reported on the existence of these internships, the 
FLA had already confronted the issue in its Foxconn Verification Report. Foxconn Verification Status 
Report, supra note 26, at Appendix 1. 
 34. David Barboza & Keith Bradsher, Foxconn Shuts Plant in Wake of Worker Riot: Foxconn Has 
Struggled with Reports of Labor Abuse and Work Safety, Int’l Herald Trib., Sept. 25, 2012, at 17, 
available at ProQuest, Document ID 1069245886. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Associated Press, Foxconn Denies Report of Unrest at iPhone Factory, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/business/foxconn-denies-report-of-unrest-at-iphone-factory.html.  
 40. Adams, supra note 6. 
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comment on the reports . . . but said that Apple’s code of conduct tells 
suppliers they must comply with local labor laws.”41 
Apple’s failed attempts to cure the defects in its global supply chain 
demonstrate how traditional attempts to voluntarily institute “corporate 
social responsibility”42 have failed workers, consumers, communities, and 
the environment. Neither internally promulgated “codes of conduct,” nor 
various permutations of external auditing could resolve the structural 
forces driving the unacceptable labor practices at Foxconn. The question, 
then, is: Why does Apple continue to use Foxconn’s manufacturing 
services? According to former Apple executives, “there is an unresolved 
tension within the company: executives want to improve conditions within 
factories, but that dedication falters when it conflicts with crucial supplier 
relationships or the fast delivery of new products.”43 To be sure, Apple is 
but one of many high-profile, transnational corporations that have 
frequently encountered bleak working conditions in their supply-chain 
systems.44 Even in the face of widespread, negative press, hegemonic 
corporate norms demand compliance with short-term profit forecasts 
because they derive from deeply set deficiencies in the legal structure of 
corporations and the laws that govern them. These symptoms cannot be 
treated on an incident-by-incident or even on a supplier-by-supplier basis.45 
While the FLA’s auditing methodology suggests that the organization is 
cognizant of the fact that the causes of sub-standard labor practices are 
systemic in origin, their prescriptions are not nearly the panacea the FLA 
seems to believe. In fact, before the FLA even released its initial report, 
rumors swirled that Apple would be relocating its iPhone and iPad 
manufacturing from China to new ten billion dollar facilities that Foxconn 
was building in Indonesia, where prevailing wages for workers are one-
third of what Chinese workers are now paid.46 Since that time, Apple has 
pledged to move some of its computer manufacturing back to the United 
States,47 but it remains to be seen whether Apple will actually implement 
this shift in production and on what scale it might do so. 
The cautionary tale of Apple and Foxconn, which will be utilized as 
a case study throughout this Note, strikes at the heart of a long-standing 
debate in corporate legal theory about the purpose of corporations in 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. See infra Part I.C. 
 43. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 1. 
 44. Id. (referencing Dell, Hewlett-Packard, I.B.M., Lenovo, Motorola, Nokia, Sony, and Toshiba 
as having similar problems as Apple). 
 45. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 46. Tim Worstall, Now Apple’s Manufacturing Is Leaving China, Forbes (July 24, 2012, 12:33 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/24/now-apples-manufacturing-is-leaving-china. 
 47. Catherine Rampell & Nick Wingfield, In Shift of Jobs, Apple Will Make Some Macs in U.S., N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/technology/apple-to-resume-us-manufacturing. 
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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“liberal capitalist”48 societies like the United States. During the Great 
Depression, a famous exchange between Adolf Augustus Berle and Edwin 
Merrick Dodd on the pages of the Harvard Law Review phrased the 
question thusly: Are corporations solely responsible to private ownership 
interests, or do they also possess obligations to benefit the general public 
welfare?49 Lines were drawn in the intellectual sand between Berle’s 
“shareholder primacy” theory and Dodd’s “stakeholder theory” of 
corporate governance—the former embracing corporations as private 
property, the latter as an integral component of any comprehensive system 
of social welfare.50 The future of corporate law and the culture of 
American business were at stake. 
As Part I details, shareholder primacy theory triumphed in the 
courts, and the “shareholder wealth maximization norm,” which made 
the promotion of shareholder returns the exclusive mandate of corporate 
decisionmaking, was unshakably ingrained into the corporate ethos.51 
The effects of this normative choice were enormous. Corporations now 
had carte blanche to focus only upon short-term considerations of profit at 
the expense of workers, consumers, communities, and the environment.52 
Although a variety of forms of corporate social responsibility emerged 
within American businesses as they were gradually sterilized of 
stakeholder-consideration norms, many were whitewashing and only a few 
proved beneficial.53 Non-profit organizations flourished as a legally 
cognizable mechanism for socially minded consumers, investors, and 
management to channel their desire to provide charitable goods and 
services.54 Progressive politicians attempted to remedy the socially 
irresponsible conduct of corporations through regulation, while also 
funding public goods and services through infrastructure projects and 
entitlement spending.55 Some consumers attempted to educate themselves 
about socially responsible businesses and boycotted producers whose 
practices they found unethical. 
 
 48. Liberal capitalism is the manifestation of neoclassical economic theory, which promotes a 
normative framework of freedom of consumer choice and a descriptive framework of rational 
consumer choice. See infra Part I.A. 
 49. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365, 
1367–69 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145, 1147–48 (1932). 
 50. See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1351, 1354–58 (2011). 
 51. See infra Part I.A. 
 52. See infra Part I.A–B. Although one does not have to conduct a sweeping historical search for 
evidence that businesses were not ever benevolent entities, this Note will contend that efforts by 
executives like Henry Ford that could have shifted the tide away from short-term thinking were stifled 
by the courts through the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
 53. See infra Part I.C. 
 54. See infra Part I.C. 
 55. See infra Part I.C. 
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While the efforts of these disparate actors have provided temporary 
salves and partial solutions, the bifurcation of profit seeking and the 
public good caused by the shareholder wealth maximization norm has 
given us a broken and highly inefficient permutation of liberal capitalism. 
The problem with placing the entire burden of the public good on non-
corporate entities is that consumers are often overwhelmed by information 
and litigation costs, the inability of non-profits to distribute dividends 
inhibits financing, and the government, whether state or federal, is often 
either too large to effectively implement programs at the local level or is 
preempted by lobbying.56 When profit seeking and the public good are 
united, however, society will no longer need to rely so heavily on external 
corrective mechanisms to solve the “market failures” of the shareholder 
wealth maximization system.57 Instead, the primary organizing entities of 
liberal capitalism—private firms—will have to constrain their own 
deleterious behavior and shoulder more of the load of providing beneficial 
public goods and services. 
Part II analyzes how the purpose and structure of the “benefit 
corporation,” the bipartisan, legislative result of a fascinating public-
private partnership, reunites profit seeking and the promotion of the 
public good in a unitary, private business entity. Unlike traditional 
corporate social responsibility codes or non-profit organizations, the 
benefit corporation affirmatively mandates a hybrid purpose: profit and 
“material positive impact on society and the environment.”58 In short, 
benefit corporations aspire to the rallying cry of the “social 
entrepreneur”—to do well while doing good.59 Benefit corporations 
provide precisely the kind of new business association through which 
consumers, investors, and management can channel their increasing 
demand for responsible business practices.60 Part II concludes, however, by 
reviewing a series of criticisms that have been leveled at the substantive 
enforcement mechanism of the benefit corporation, a third-party auditing 
standard that benefit corporations self-apply to evaluate whether they are 
effectively implementing their duty to provide for the public good. 
Part III concurs with these criticisms and proposes a simple 
statutory construction and litigation strategy that courts and plaintiffs 
could respectively apply to ensure that benefit corporations do not shirk 
their duty to the public—at least until the corporate form and its case law 
mature further. Through the express private right of action statutorily 
 
 56. See infra Part I.C. 
 57. See infra Part I.C. 
 58. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c) (West 2012). See generally id. §§ 14600–20. 
 59. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary 
Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
409, 409 (2002). 
 60. See infra Part II.A. 
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identified as a “benefit enforcement proceeding,” this Note contends that 
shareholders and dissenting directors can and should seek injunctive relief 
for breaches of the procedural “duty of consideration of non-shareholder 
interests” by the board of directors and the corporation. These suits would 
parallel procedural actions filed against federal actors under the National 
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”)61 in that they would only seek 
to enforce procedural consideration of non-shareholder interests, not 
particular substantive outcomes, because those would be governed by the 
highly deferential “business judgment rule.”62 Anticipating criticism about 
the high costs this would impose on benefit corporations, this Note argues 
that the lack of standing for third-party beneficiaries, statutory 
requirements that the action considered be “material,” the fact that—as 
shareholders and directors—those with standing have monetary interests 
aligned with the corporation, and civil pleading requirements will restrain 
vexatious litigation while ensuring the proper enforcement of the duty of 
public benefit.63 
This Note concludes by providing a few final thoughts on the future 
of the benefit corporation and how it could solve problems plaguing 
entities like Apple and Foxconn. 
I.  Shareholder Wealth Maximization Has Unsustainably 
Exacerbated the Impact of Market Failures 
To understand why the shareholder wealth maximization norm has 
become intrinsic to American business, it is necessary to detail how 
shareholder primacy theorists and stakeholder theorists once competed for 
the soul of corporate governance and to document the triumph of the 
former over the latter in decisional law and persuasive authority. Although 
the descriptive model of shareholder primacy has ultimately been cast 
aside by modern corporate legal theorists, the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm that accompanied it has remained. As a result, 
American liberal capitalism has been transformed into a system in which 
the disparate interventions of non-profit organizations, private firms, the 
state, and consumers must join forces to perform the Sisyphean task of 
externally correcting for the market failures caused by the organizing 
conduct of corporations, instead of mandating that firms constrain their 
own behavior through internal mechanisms that are enforced by corporate 
litigation. 
 
 61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2006). 
 62. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (analyzing various 
approaches to the business judgment rule); see also Robert W. Hamilton et al., Cases and Materials 
on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies 638–738 (11th ed. 2010). 
 63. See infra Part III.C. 
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A. Berle-Dodd and the Triumph of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm 
What is the purpose of corporate governance? Are corporations, as 
controlled by their directors and management, solely responsible to their 
shareholders who comprise the ownership of the entity? Or are 
corporations also responsible to their stakeholders—those whose lives 
are directly affected by the business’s operations, such as employees, 
consumers, and local communities? Regardless of descriptive accuracy, 
which position has normative merit? The answer to these questions took 
shape in the debate between Berle and Dodd over eighty years ago.64 To 
understand the facets of their arguments, it is critical to understand that 
the division between Berle’s shareholder primacy theory and Dodd’s 
stakeholder theory of corporate governance is the result of two competing 
descriptive and normative frameworks.65 
Shareholder primacy theorists like Berle—who believe that 
traditional corporations are responsible solely to their owners—adhere to 
a “private property” conceptualization of the corporation.66 The 
descriptive and normative components of this position are inextricably 
linked, at least as a matter of logical syllogism. Shareholders are, by 
definition, the only parties with an ownership stake in the corporate 
enterprise.67 In exchange for their equity investment, shareholders should 
receive the entirety of the benefit from corporate pursuits, as profits are 
distributed by the board of directors through dividend payments.68 
Shareholder primacy theorists contend that this descriptive outcome is 
normatively justified because of the risk intrinsic to equity investments.69 
Given that shareholders could lose all of their money if the corporate 
venture becomes insolvent, they should be accorded the appropriate 
reward if and when the enterprise succeeds financially.70 Moreover, 
because shareholder ownership is “passive,” in the sense that shareholders 
rarely exercise any significant decisionmaking authority within a 
corporation,71 directors and managers must function as the “mere 
stewards” of the shareholders’ ownership interests.72 In this way, the 
 
 64. Berle, supra note 49, at 1367–69; Dodd, supra note 49, at 1147–48. 
 65. See, e.g., Berle, supra note 49, at 1367–69; Dodd, supra note 49, at 1147–48. 
 66. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 261, 264–65 (1992). 
 67. Hamilton, supra note 62, at 267–69. 
 68. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1433–35 (1993). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate 
Governance, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1409, 1413 (1993). 
 72. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 4–6 
(2002). It is worth noting that Bainbridge is certainly not a shareholder primacy theorist in the sense 
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management’s fiduciary duties of care73 and loyalty74 are analogous to 
those of a “trustee” and her “trust.”75 Therefore, directors and managers 
must have the sole duty of maximizing the profits delivered to the 
shareholders—within the constraints of the law—because that is in the 
“best interest” of the corporation.76 Any other framework for governing 
director and management conduct would necessarily falter because the 
property management relationship at the heart of the corporation would 
be undermined.77 
The descriptive private property model that undergirds shareholder 
primacy, however, has been extensively criticized and deconstructed by 
Stephen Bainbridge and other modern “contractarian” theorists.78 
Bainbridge conceptualizes the corporation not as private property, but as 
a “nexus of contracts” between the various constituencies of the 
corporation, with the board of directors sitting as the “nexus.”79 By doing 
so, Bainbridge and other contractarians have undermined the theoretical 
underpinnings of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. The private 
property model assumes that shareholders are the only constituency that 
matters in the eyes of the corporation; the corporation is their trust and the 
directorate is their trustee. The contractarian model, however, considers 
shareholders to be merely the parties to a corporation’s equity contracts. 
Although the corporation may prioritize the shareholders over other 
constituent contracting parties by providing them with voting rights and a 
contingent interest in capital disbursements, shareholders are but one of 
many putative beneficiaries of the corporation’s contractual obligations. 
In other words, corporations do not and should not function solely for 
their shareholders, but for all of their contractual constituents. Workers 
and consumers—through employment and purchase contracts—are also 
therefore stakeholders in the corporate enterprise. Granted, unlike their 
shareholders, corporations may not have indefinite contractual 
obligations with their employees or their consumers, but the fact remains 
that corporations still owe them certain obligations in conformity with 
their promises and the law. And although contemporary legal philosophy 
 
that he does not believe that shareholder primacy is an accurate descriptive model. For our purposes, 
however, Bainbridge is a defender of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, which is the 
normative extension of shareholder primacy. 
 73. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.60 (2008) (stating that directors must not engage in self-
dealing transactions and must serve the corporation’s interests before their own). 
 74. See id. § 8.30(a) (“Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a 
director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation.”). 
 75. See generally Berle, supra note 49. 
 76. See generally id.; see also Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 4.01(a) (1994). 
 77. See generally Berle, supra note 49. 
 78. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 3–8. 
 79. Id. 
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is far from recognizing communities and the environment as contractual 
constituents to corporate enterprise, corporations still possess negative 
legal duties toward both. Shareholder primacy theorists were thus too 
clever by half; the extremely passive nature of equity ownership 
exaggerates the diktat of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
Despite that fact, Bainbridge maintains that shareholder wealth 
maximization is still an optimal norm of corporate governance.80 He 
contends that if traditional corporate directors and managers are required 
to subsidize external constituencies—like employees and local 
communities—by ignoring the directive of shareholder wealth 
maximization, business will become highly inefficient and cost 
prohibitive.81 Moreover, directors and management will take advantage of 
shareholders by reallocating corporate wealth to themselves by playing 
shareholder and non-shareholder interests off one another.82 In sum, 
Bainbridge advances the commonplace notion that business simply cannot 
successfully operate without an exclusive and driving focus on short-term 
corporate profits. While maintaining efficiency is an entirely valid 
concern, Bainbridge and other proponents of shareholder wealth 
maximization set forth no empirical evidence to support the notion that 
alternative corporate-governance frameworks would necessarily falter. 
Shareholder wealth maximization was borne of a defunct descriptive 
framework, and Bainbridge's arguments amount to nothing more than 
post hoc justifications for maintenance of the status quo. But even if 
Bainbridge is correct that traditional corporations cannot function 
without the shareholder wealth maximization norm, this Note contends 
that is only proof we must embrace new corporate structures that permit 
consideration of non-shareholder interests. 
To that effect, Dodd believed the corporation must be “tinged with 
a public purpose” because, at heart, the corporation is a “social 
institution.”83 The corporate form, he argued, is the byproduct of a 
bargain between the state and private actors to construct a vehicle for 
wealth creation that carries concurrent obligations to parties beyond its 
direct owners.84 In exchange for limited liability and access to vast capital 
resources available on state-regulated stock exchanges,85 corporations have 
 
 80. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 3–8. 
 81. Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 1433–35. 
 82. Id. at 1442 (describing the twin problems of “two masters” and “managerial sin,” and stating 
that, as a result, the stakeholder model “is less likely to transfer wealth from shareholders to 
nonshareholder constituencies, as [Professor Ronald M. Green] apparently envisions, than it is to 
transfer wealth from both shareholders and nonshareholders to managers”). 
 83. Allen, supra note 66, at 264–76; Dodd, supra note 49, at 1147–48. 
 84. Allen, supra note 66, at 264–76; Dodd, supra note 49, at 1147–48; see Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Rise of the Uncorporation (2010); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063 (2001). 
 85. Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 95 (1995). 
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not just a moral, but also a fiduciary, obligation to provide “the satisfaction 
of consumer wants, the provision of meaningful employment 
opportunities, and the making of a contribution to the public life of its 
communities.”86 Like their shareholder primacy counterparts, stakeholder 
theorists believe that their position is not only descriptively accurate, but 
also normatively justified.87 Without consideration of non-shareholder 
interests, society and the environment will suffer the costs of production in 
the face of organizations that have the sole purpose of maximizing profit.88 
This problem will be further compounded as corporations leverage their 
vast resources to deregulate their business practices to increase profits, a 
logical byproduct of shareholder wealth maximization.89 There can be little 
doubt that the result has been the construction of an unsustainable form of 
liberal capitalism.90 One need not look far to understand how corporations 
have undermined the sustainability of our economic modality through 
political interference in the debates involving climate change,91 increased 
criminalization and prison overcrowding,92 and gun control,93 to name but a 
few examples. Any increased profits enabled by shareholder wealth 
maximization are far outweighed by the costs traditional corporations 
have imposed on Americans and the world at large. It is, in fact, entirely 
consummate with capitalism’s macroeconomic maxim of wealth creation 
to ensure sustainable market conditions through stakeholder 
considerations like effective resource management and ethical labor 
conditions. 
Although the descriptive power of the shareholder primacy model 
collapsed over the course of the twentieth century,94 the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm that accompanied shareholder primacy still 
 
 86. Allen, supra note 66, at 271; see id. at 264–76; Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency 
Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & Com. 257, 263 (1995). 
 87. See generally Green, supra note 71. 
 88. See generally id. 
 89. See Frank René López, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy After September 
11: Profits, Freedom, and Human Rights, 55 Mercer L. Rev. 739, 753–54 (2004); see also Kelly v. Bell, 
254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969) (authorizing extensive payments by a corporation to a local government 
on the grounds that the entity had a long-term interest in the community and therefore the payments 
were justified by shareholder wealth maximization). 
 90. Dodd, supra note 49, at 1152; see Marshall M. Magaro, Note, Two Birds, One Stone: 
Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 Ind. L.J. 1149, 
1152 (2010). 
 91. Andrew C. Revkin, Industry Ignored Its Scientists on Climate Change, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 92. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Mass Incarceration and Criminal Justice in America, 
New Yorker, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_ 
atlarge_gopnik. 
 93. Jordan Weissmann, Whom Does the NRA Really Speak For?, Atlantic, Dec. 18, 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/whom-does-the-nra-really-speak-for/266373. 
 94. Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 3–8. 
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normatively won out the day.95 To be sure, by the time that the Berle and 
Dodd debate took shape, the victory of shareholder wealth maximization 
had already been presaged by the seminal decision of Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company.96 Henry Ford, the prominent automobile industrialist, 
declared that as a matter of corporate policy, Ford Motor Company 
would invest all capital profits into hiring more workers, “to spread the 
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help 
them build up their lives and their homes.”97 After shareholders filed a 
derivative suit, the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately held against 
Ford, stating: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change 
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.98 
The language is striking: Directors work for shareholders exclusively. To 
that end, there can never be an action that results in the “reduction of 
profits.” The only choice ever to be made is how to generate more capital. 
Without a doubt, the shareholder wealth maximization norm permits no 
other considerations but itself—it presents a bright-line for corporate 
governance. 
The opinion in Dodge has stood the test of time, including the 
period of intense debate following the Berle-Dodd exchange: Most 
corporate legal theorists agree that the “theory of shareholder wealth 
maximization has been widely accepted by courts over an extended 
period.”99 Further decisional law has further ingrained the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm,100 as seen most recently in the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s holding in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.101 
Although that case was decided in the context of a potential acquisition 
 
 95. Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 
8–9 (2008) (“[B]ecause of a mix of law, norms, and market dynamics, the touchstone of corporate 
success is the maximization of shareholder return. . . . On the whole, shareholder primacy is a fact of 
life in the United States in the early twenty-first century.”). 
 96. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 97. Id. at 468. 
 98. Id.; see Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 
10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 34 (2005) (“The starting-point for any discussion of the case law is the 
1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford . . . .”). 
 99. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 411–13 (2002); see William H. 
Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business 
Corporations, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 817, 825–28 (2012) (discussing how decisional law and 
persuasive authority have wholeheartedly adopted shareholder wealth maximization). 
 100. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust 
Co., 130 N.E.2d 442, 449 (Ohio 1954). 
 101. See 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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and various takeover defenses, the court was emphatic in its declaration 
that shareholder wealth maximization is the law of the Delaware courts.102 
Some commentators, like Judd Sneirson and Julie A. Nelson, believe 
that the prominence of the norm is overstated.103 Sneirson points to some 
opinions, like Schlensky v. Wrigley,104 which have sought to temper the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm by permitting the consideration of 
non-shareholder interests in the short-term, such that long-term 
shareholder wealth is maximized.105 The effect of these opinions, however, 
has been limited to operations that will ultimately benefit shareholders 
directly.106 Nelson, an economist, denies the legal origins of the norm, 
contending that the only reason shareholder wealth maximization exists 
in practice is because “the idea was invented and has maintained its 
power to shape our thinking through mutually reinforcing historical, 
social, and political processes.”107 This is at best a question of the chicken 
and the egg. Nelson still admits that corporations continue to act as profit 
maximizers as a result of these metastructural forces.108 But what we can 
take away from her criticism is “the belief that there is something 
intrinsic in the economic . . . structure of commerce that forces firms, 
inexorably, as if run on rails, to neglect values of care and concern in 
order to strive for every last dollar of profits” is fundamentally untrue.109 
Our system of corporate governance was a choice.110 
B. How the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm Shifted the 
Burden of Market Failures from Private Firms to Non-Profits, 
the State, and the Public 
The success of the shareholder wealth maximization norm engrained 
a fundamental understanding of the purpose of corporate governance in 
the United States. With corporations no longer able to consider non-
shareholder interests and sterilized of any stakeholder-consideration 
norms, the American economic system of liberal capitalism was 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from Economics and 
Law, 35 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 69, 71 (2011); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, 
Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 987, 995–1017 (2009). 
 104. 237 N.E.2d 776, 776–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 105. Sneirson, supra note 103, at 71. 
 106. It is worth noting that the corporation at issue in the Schlensky litigation ultimately caved to 
shareholders’ demands for profit maximization at the expense of concerns about the local community 
within fifteen years of the decision. Carrie Muskat, Chicago Remembers ‘Opening Night’, Chi. Cubs 
MLB (Aug. 7, 2008, 10:00 AM), http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20080806&content_ 
id=3267159&vkey=news_chc&fext=.jsp&c_id=chc (describing the interesting historical conclusion to 
the Schlensky saga). 
 107. Nelson, supra note 103, at 71–72. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.; see Roe, supra note 84, at 2065. 
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confronted with a serious dilemma: Who would shoulder the burden of its 
“market failures”? Before answering that question, it is necessary to detail 
the structure of liberal capitalism and the nature of market failures. Only 
then can the system of burden allocation that the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm created become apparent and available for criticism. 
The normative tenet of liberal capitalism is that consumers and 
producers should be given the freedom to make their own economic 
choices in an open and deregulated marketplace.111 Individual liberty and 
private property rights are thus the fundamental concerns of liberal 
capitalism; freedom of choice is the “why,” and private property rights are 
the “how.”112 Wealth, the medium by which consumers acquire goods and 
services, is generated exclusively through the instrumentalization and 
exchange of land, labor, and capital by and between actors in the 
marketplace.113 In order to operationalize these transactions, liberal 
capitalist societies, like the United States, rely on private, for-profit 
business associations, “firms,” to organize the vast majority of their 
economic activity and allocate wealth, goods, and services to their 
populations.114 As economist Ronald Coase famously explained, firms 
emerge “when it is efficient to substitute entrepreneurial fiat for the 
[existing] price mechanisms of the market,” creating more effective 
mechanisms for distribution.115 In other words, private commercial 
entities become economically viable when their method of production 
improves upon the status quo. According to the neo-classical economic 
model underpinning liberal capitalism, this system should result in total 
“allocative efficiency,”116 whereby supply entirely meets demand.117 
While there is no doubt that liberal capitalism has been a historical 
boon for the standard of living of many millions of its denizens,118 its 
organizing entities have empirically failed to address certain shortcomings 
 
 111. Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today 20 (1993). 
 112. See id. 
 113. William Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce 462–66 (5th ed. 
1910). 
 114. Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 59, 65–67 
(2010); see R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 6 (1988) (“Most people in [liberal 
capitalist societies] are employed by firms, . . . most production takes place within firms, and . . . the 
efficiency of the whole economic system depends to a very considerable extent on what happens 
within these economic molecules.”). 
 115. Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 17–18 (discussing R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 
4 Economica 386, 389 (1937) (“[T]he distinguishing mark of the firm is the suppression of the price 
mechanism.”)). 
 116. Robert Pitofsky et al., Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials 152–54 (5th ed. 2010). 
 117. Julie A. Nelson, supra note 103, at 72 (“The core model of mainstream economics, as it is 
taught in the United States and in many other countries, is the ‘neo-classical’ model in which 
autonomous, rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals and profit-maximizing firms 
interact on ‘perfectly competitive’ markets. In such a hypothetical economy, all resources should end 
up being used in the most efficient way possible.”). 
 118. See generally Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962). 
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in this largely informal system of collective distribution.119 The story of 
“market failures” is not new, but it bears repeating. Firms consistently 
undersupply, by any empirical measure, public or collective goods 
(“positive externalities”) while simultaneously failing to internalize many 
costs that are imposed on outsiders as the result of production (“negative 
externalities”).120 The allocative efficiency of contemporary liberal 
capitalism is thus far from optimal.121 It is important to detail what market 
failures look like in theory and practice to understand how the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm exacerbated an already flawed system of 
collective distribution. Such detail can also illustrate how we might help 
repair that system. 
Positive externalities, like environmental repair, transportation 
infrastructure, or national defense, are not efficiently and satisfactorily 
produced as the natural byproduct of unregulated market economies.122 A 
dearth of positive externalities occurs in part because firms are generally 
concerned that other firms, particularly competitors, will “free ride” on 
any contributions they make to the public good without contributing 
similarly.123 For example, a firm may be unwilling to pay for a road through 
the town center near its manufacturing plant because, while beneficial for 
its own employees to get to work, it simultaneously benefits other nearby 
firms whose employees will similarly benefit from the construction and 
maintenance of the road. Even though the firm's incentive to increase 
worker productivity is aligned with the construction of a public good, it 
may still refuse to expend capital toward that end because its actions 
would subsidize competitors in the same way without any associated 
cost.124 Moreover, in the process of acting in the name of the public good, 
a firm might believe that it is functionally redistributing its wealth to 
those without an ownership stake in the firm, arguably denying the risk 
bearers of the enterprise the fruits of their investment.125 Similarly, firms 
may wish to invest their capital profits back into the firm in order to 
 
 119. Steven Munch, Note, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 Nw J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 170, 170 (2012) 
(“The corporation today is often cast as villain instead of hero. At times it is framed as the exploiter of 
labor and destroyer of communities. At others, it is the insatiable consumer of natural resources. It 
may be seen as driven only by the need for growth and profit. Protected by limited liability and 
emboldened by vast capital resources, the corporation has legal personality, but presumably no 
interest in humanity.”). 
 120. Katz & Page, supra note 114, at 60, 65–67 (“A market economy predictably under-produces 
certain urgent public or collective goods, such as a clean environment. It also perpetuates gross 
inequalities in resources among people and across regions.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
Times Mag., Sept. 13, 1970; see also Katz & Page, supra note 114, at 70. 
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expand their operational capacity or increase compensation for 
employees.126 In a liberal capitalist economic system, firms have little 
structural incentive to contribute to the public good by producing positive 
externalities. The fact that firms are prohibited from creating positive 
externalities unless congruent with profit maximization is an outrageous 
decision to make.127 That choice is disastrous because it theoretically 
apportions the entire burden of creating positive externalities onto non-
corporate actors, while totally unburdening corporate actors—the primary 
organizing entities of the whole liberal-capitalist system.128 To be sure, the 
state should maintain responsibility for the construction and maintenance 
of certain positive externalities like military defense. Privatization of these 
public goods and services would be highly problematic129 because private 
firms should not be permitted to substitute their entrepreneurial fiat for 
the democratic political processes behind these projects. But that is no 
reason to prevent private firms from acting in the name of the public 
good as it pertains to conduct incidental to their business practices. 
Firms also often externalize harmful production costs onto society 
without taking them into financial account, at least not as an initial matter. 
These are negative externalities.130 For example, a firm that manufactures 
an industrial solvent may decide that rather than disposing of toxic 
chemical byproducts from its production process through appropriate 
channels, it could just dump the chemicals into a nearby public water 
supply without paying for disposal services. In this way, a firm avoids a 
necessary production cost from being calculated into its immediate 
financial bottom line, while pushing the cost onto third parties who will 
suffer from exposure to the toxic chemicals.131 When common spaces are 
harmed as a result of negative externalities, the problem is known as “the 
tragedy of the commons”132 because firms will not shoulder the burden of 
the positive externality of environmental cleanup in a framework of 
shareholder wealth maximization. Foxconn’s dumping of hazardous waste 
in the local communities surrounding its manufacturing plant effectively 
illustrates what these kinds of negative externalities look like in practice.133 
Negative externalities do not, however, have to be as invidious as the 
preceding example. In the interest of efficient operation, a firm could 
decide to replace large swaths of its workforce with cheaper automated 
machines. While this business decision may certainly increase the 
 
 126. Hamilton, supra note 62, at 267–75. 
 127. See supra Part I.A. 
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 133. See supra Introduction. 
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profitability of the company, it might have the effect of decimating a local 
community that depends on that manufacturing base to supply its wealth. 
As a result, the community could fall into poverty—increasing crime and 
eroding the surrounding culture. The firm could not be said, however, to 
be culpable in the traditional criminal or tortious sense, at least under 
American law. As a matter of allocative efficiency, this outcome might 
not even be suboptimal. For instance, if greater wealth is generated such 
that more highly skilled, higher-paid positions are created, one could 
easily argue that this is a positive externality of innovation and not a 
negative externality at all. That being said, there are also hypothetical 
situations in which a manufacturing plant is moved from a community 
that is highly dependent on it for jobs, to another community that has a 
diverse source of employment, merely to take advantage of a lower 
corporate tax rate. But what is important is that firms operating under the 
guise of the shareholder wealth maximization norm cannot decide which 
outcome is ethically superior because the decreased tax rate, keeping all 
other variables constant, would be dispositive. The norm does not permit 
the intentional reduction of profits. And although the jobs created for 
Chinese workers may have increased their standard of living as compared 
to the largely agrarian jobs that they possessed before,134 the jobs Apple 
created in China necessarily came at the cost of positions with higher labor 
standards elsewhere. For this reason, there may be nothing per se 
unethical about outsourcing. But, at some point, the deontological right to 
ethical labor conditions must trump utilitarian gains. Otherwise, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm will continually drive labor 
standards lower and lower, as workers compete for less and less. 
Further, negative externalities create a negative feedback mechanism 
in which the harms they inflict increase demand for their corresponding 
positive externalities, further increasing the market price of public goods.135 
For example, the more damage one does to local environments, the more 
scarce clean environments become, which drives up the cost of using clean 
space. And as corporations have grown increasingly multinational, a “race 
to the bottom” is well underway, as entities seek out locations with the 
lowest regulatory standards.136 Foxconn’s reported transfer of Apple 
production facilities from China to Indonesia is one such example. Why 
does this happen? Because countries with low regulatory standards are the 
cheapest options, and the shareholder wealth maximization norm dictates 
firms find loopholes and ways around compliance with the ethical 
decisions underlying more stringent regulations. Apple’s need for the 
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cheapest and most scalable production facilities virtually required it to 
attain Foxconn’s supply chain services under that paradigm of business.137 
Without proper intervention, it is clear that the shortage of public 
goods and services and the abundance of harms caused by market failures 
threaten to undermine sustainable development on a global scale.138 From 
deleterious changes to communities, to the degradation of ecosystems 
necessary to sustain life as we know it, there may be a point of no return 
looming on the horizon.139 The shareholder wealth maximization norm 
has exacerbated this risk by handicapping the primary economic actors 
from manifesting ethical changes in the market. Our liberal capitalism is 
a broken distributive system. 
C. Public and Private Interventions into the Marketplace Have 
Been Inadequate 
In recognition of the structural gap left by liberal capitalism and later 
widened by the shareholder wealth maximization norm, public and private 
non-corporate entities have made interventions into the marketplace to 
provide positive externalities and help administer remedies for negative 
externalities.140 In many ways, this was a logical byproduct of the 
bifurcation of profit seeking and providing for the public good in firms. 
The assistance that these disparate public and private actors have provided 
is best considered as an external corrective mechanism; their actions are 
meant to correct for the acts and omissions of third parties in the context 
of market failures. Corporate entities, for their part, have adopted 
voluntary codes of corporate social responsibility for a variety of reasons 
and in a variety of forms.141 Corporate social responsibility is an example of 
an internal corrective mechanism because it is enacted by corporations as a 
measure of preventative care for non-shareholder interests. While 
corporate social responsibility, especially when exercised in conjunction 
with “constituency statutes,” might appear to be sufficient to remedy 
market failures without the assistance of corporate entities, in practice this 
has not held true.142 After briefly reviewing the various external and 
internal corrective responses to market failures in our system—principally 
addressing non-profit organizations and consumers, the government, and 
private firms operating under the guise of corporate social responsibility—
this Note contends that there is a better alternative, as explained in Part II. 
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Non-profit organizations are one manner in which private actors can 
avoid the constraints of the shareholder wealth maximization norm while 
seeking to provide positive externalities in a formalized legal construct.143 
These organizations function as a line of defense for marginalized 
segments of society and attempt to provide undersupplied public, as well 
as “mixed,” goods and services.144 Non-profit organizations can function in 
several different capacities: They may serve to reduce information 
asymmetries for consumers by providing information about suppliers, they 
may merely provide public goods and services in a donative capacity, or 
they may sell commercial goods to raise money for other donative 
efforts.145 In order to understand how non-profit organizations are 
structurally enabled to accomplish those goals—but ultimately fall short of 
being a comprehensive corrective mechanism—it is important to discuss 
their structural characteristics. 
Non-profit organizations have no traditional “ownership” 
characteristics, passive or otherwise.146 In this way, non-profit organizations 
do not suffer from the risk of inculcating notions of private property that 
control the traditional corporation. Non-profit organizations are also 
united by their “other-regarding orientation,”147 making them theoretically 
antithetical to for-profit enterprise. In exchange for tax-exempt status,148 
however, non-profit organizations must not pay out any dividends to 
shareholders.149 This is known as the “non-distribution constraint.”150 
Economics and law professor Henry Hansmann considers the non-
distribution constraint to be the “critical and defining characteristic”151 of 
the non-profit organization.152 Non-profits generating an operating profit 
also have an affirmative duty to distribute that capital to advance the 
organization’s charitable interest.153 While non-profit organizations help 
to provide a significant safety net, especially in the context of purely 
public, non-commercial goods, there are several deficiencies in their legal 
structure that do not render them a totally effective external corrective 
mechanism for market failures. Most problematically, the non-distribution 
constraint makes non-profit organizations an unattractive proposition for 
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investment.154 Without proper financing, non-profit organizations are left 
to sell commercial goods in an attempt to remain operationally 
sustainable.155 This makes the provision of purely public goods costly and 
reliant on donations for support.156 More importantly, as an external 
corrective mechanism, non-profit entities do not provide anything more 
than a hopefully enduring band-aid for the problem of market failures. 
“Corporate social responsibility” is an attempt by traditional 
corporations to have the best of both the private and non-profit worlds: 
shareholder wealth maximization and simultaneous adherence to moral 
obligation.157 Through voluntarily instated codes of conduct, corporations 
like Apple have attempted to end the Berle-Dodd debate permanently 
by limiting negative externalities and providing for the public good, while 
still operating under the guise of shareholder wealth maximization.158 
From the outset, it is worth noting that there is no consensus for a 
general definition of corporate social responsibility.159 “[W]hilst some see 
it as a management trend, others view it as a framework of ‘soft regulation’ 
that places new demands on corporations, whilst others present it as a way 
for corporate actors to assist in the social and economic development.”160 
In truth, corporate social responsibility takes all of these forms in the 
spectrum of its implementation. Some corporate actors probably have 
sincere commitments to sustainable business practices and are successful 
in doing so. Others who share this same commitment are less successful, 
ultimately turning a blind eye to violations of their codes.161 One 
problem, as illustrated by the story of Apple and Foxconn, is that 
voluntary attempts at corporate social responsibility become obfuscated 
by the shareholder wealth maximization norm.162 If the ethical principles 
underlying the code of conduct begin to conflict with meeting investor 
expectations, the corporation will often turn its back on the code. 
Another traditional response to the deficiencies of bifurcating profit 
seeking and the public good has been governmental intervention into the 
marketplace.163 One could even say that escaping the deleterious effects of 
liberal capitalism and the shareholder wealth maximization norm has been 
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the sole preoccupation of the social-welfare state since the mid-twentieth 
century. When the state intervenes on behalf of its undersupplied or 
harmed populations, it either legally regulates the conduct of private 
business entities to deter or encourage certain behavior, or provides 
goods, services, or wealth directly to individuals as compensation for 
their socioeconomic standing.164 Entitlement programs and other forms 
of social welfare are questionably effective as anything other than a pure 
stop-gap for harm to the most undersupplied and marginalized 
populations. While this is undoubtedly an important function, welfare in 
and of itself will not correct the deficiencies of the market; it is merely 
another band-aid. Through legislation, the government can create 
substantive laws, such as tort liability and employment codes, to reign in 
the conduct of corporate entities. But while laws may check the extent of 
the abuse in the construction of blatant negative externalities,165 more 
subtle examples, such as those outlined in Part I.B, are left unaddressed. 
Moreover, consumer litigation is expensive, information costs are high, 
and consumers are often ill-equipped to redeem their rights.166 These 
information and resource asymmetries are further compounded by 
corporations that attempt to deregulate their fields in order to continue 
to expand upon shareholder wealth.167 
Like Bainbridge, some corporate legal theorists believe that external 
remedies via the political process and the judicial system effectively 
remedy market failures stemming from the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.168 While state oversight is undoubtedly important to 
ensure compliance with legal remedies, the preventative care embodied in 
the notion of internal corrective mechanisms seems logically preferable to 
primary reliance on state action. For one thing, enforcement through 
litigation requires the violation of a right.169 Where a recognized right 
exists, the best case outcome involves the courts adjudicating a remedy for 
the injury through an award of compensatory or equitable remedies.170 
Where no recognized right exists, the injured party is left to appeal to the 
political process in order to establish a right for future, putatively injured 
parties. While Bainbridge believes that external corrections are more than 
sufficient to secure an equitable social outcome,171 the fact of the matter is 
that in both scenarios, harm occurs. The clear theoretical alternative is a 
system of corporate law that embraces preventative care through internal 
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corrective mechanisms that seek to prevent harm from happening in the 
first place by instituting a structural change within the entity. 
In fact, the idea of permitting and incentivizing preventative care 
within the structure of corporations is not a new one. Constituency 
statutes, which permit traditional corporations to consider non-
shareholder interests, were the most heralded governmental intervention 
into the marketplace of recent years for this reason. These statutes were 
introduced primarily in response to the once-accelerating threat of hostile 
takeovers that came to prominence in the late twentieth century.172 In the 
event that hostile investors made a tender offer to the shareholders in 
order to seize control of the company and then, for instance, to slash 
employment to pay off their leveraged debt, existing management could 
justify actions to quash the takeover with constituency statutes.173 Many 
hoped that constituency statutes would expand from these humble 
beginnings to affirmatively alter the structure of corporate governance 
from the Berle model toward the Dodd model, the construction of a larger 
internal corrective mechanism. In the end, however, constituency statutes 
failed to achieve much change because they were confined in use to the 
context of takeover defenses. Even in that context, constituency statutes 
often were used as a mechanism to enable the entrenchment of existing 
management, rather than to defend other stakeholder interests.174 As 
Jonathan Springer, the preeminent scholar on constituency statutes, 
noted, “if there is any fundamental change in corporate law that will 
address constituency interests, it will be only as the result of a direct 
engagement of the legal and economic underpinnings of corporate law.”175 
To implement a multi-stakeholder approach to corporate governance, 
corporate reformers must challenge the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm outright. 
That being said, we must still consider the role of consumers as the 
ultimate external corrective mechanism for market failures. Because 
consumer demand largely drives the conduct of firms within the liberal 
capitalist system, consumer action presents a unique engine for change.176 
One inference that could be drawn from Apple’s cautionary tale is that 
consumer demand has finally reached an inflection point at which the 
malfeasance and nonfeasance of corporate pasts, whether foreign or 
domestic in nature, shall no longer be tolerated.177 Despite the fact that 
the purported abuses were extraterritorial in nature, it was American 
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consumers who mobilized to protest the actions of Apple and Foxconn.178 
To that effect, recent polls have shown that sixty-eight million American 
consumers have stated that they make purchasing decisions “based upon 
their sense of social and environmental responsibility,”179 and forty-nine 
percent have said that they will punish a company for socially 
irresponsible behavior by boycotting their goods and/or services.180 
Moreover, mechanisms for alerting consumers of corporate misdoing are 
more efficient and transnational than ever, with crowd-sourced, non-profit 
petition organizations like change.org galvanizing a host of highly effective 
protests and boycotts against previously unchallenged governmental and 
private conduct.181 This synergy between consumers and non-profits 
significantly reduces information asymmetries, increasing the effectiveness 
of both. Consumers have further harnessed their burgeoning social 
philosophy by transforming their purchasing power into business 
investments. Socially conscious investors now control over $2.3 trillion, 
which equates to approximately ten percent of all managed assets in the 
United States.182 
Certainly, these alterations to consumer demand and investment 
philosophy are positive developments for external corrective mechanisms. 
The fact remains, however, that consumers alone will not be able to 
remedy the structural shortcomings of for-profit business associations. 
Unless and until the state provides new corporate forms for private firms 
to channel the demand for more socially responsible and sustainable 
business conduct, companies like Apple will continue to effectuate 
deleterious externalities outside the scope of American labor and 
environmental law. Voluntary codes of conduct, the only recourse to the 
public good available to traditional corporations, will continue to fail. 
And despite the significant deterrence regime that consumers, non-profit 
organizations, and the state have constructed, external corrective 
mechanisms can only go so far to protect and supply the public good. If 
harm occurs as a result of corporate decisionmaking, there is a significant 
lag time between the deleterious conduct and the public’s ability to 
constrain that behavior, assuming that the harmful conduct is ever 
noticed at all. Only a complete restructuring of the corporate legal entity 
that alters both the pattern of corrective action and the manner in which 
companies do business will construct a more sustainable form of liberal 
capitalism that fairly apportions the burden of market failures. 
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II.  Change from Within: Social Entrepreneurship and the 
Benefit Corporation 
The future of private business firms in liberal capitalist societies 
stands at a crossroads. Despite the many valiant efforts of non-profits, 
corporate social responsibility programs, government intervention, and 
consumer action, there exists a much more efficient and far less costly 
solution to the problem of market failures. Recent developments have 
reflected a growing consensus that, regardless of whether traditional 
corporate forms are permitted or obligated to pursue moral courses of 
action that are beneficial to the public good, business entrepreneurs 
should be provided an outlet in which it is unquestioned that they are 
allowed and, in fact, commanded to do so. As noted above, this desire 
has been undergirded by a chorus of consumer and investor voices that 
believe the current state of corporate law has doomed non-corporate 
entities to shoulder the entire burden of market failures.183 The only way 
to ensure sustainable development on a global scale is to build the 
consideration of non-shareholder interests into the very legal structure of 
the corporation.184 Even Berle himself ultimately agreed that, when “a 
convincing system of community obligations is worked out . . . the passive 
property rights of today must yield before the larger interests of society.”185 
Leaving enforcement to external corrective mechanisms like consumer 
boycotts, non-shareholder litigation, and non-profit organizations is an 
inefficient system that fails to construct adequate deterrence and incentive 
measures for corporate entities. It is time to reunite the bifurcated 
pursuit of profit and the public good. We can do so by enabling consumer 
demand to flow into the benefit corporation. 
A. Social Entrepreneurship Challenges Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
In recognition of the market and legal deficiencies noted in Part I, 
leading academics and businesspeople have issued a clarion call to envision 
a structural change to our methods of production. When former Chairman 
of Microsoft Bill Gates called for the construction of “a more creative 
capitalism” in a highly visible speech at the commencement of Harvard 
University,186 Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yusef responded with his 
articulation of dual-purpose business associations.187 Yusef’s theoretical 
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model seeks to serve both profitability and public benefit— what has been 
deemed a “blended enterprise.”188 Blended enterprises have received much 
attention recently because they provide a break from the pitfalls of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.189 And as evidenced by the rise of 
“social entrepreneurship,” there is sufficient management interest to 
implement modifications to traditional corporate practice.190 
Social entrepreneurs primarily seek to avoid the pitfalls of the 
shareholder maximization norm by allowing management to form dual-
purpose business entities: corporate forms that pursue both profit and the 
public good.191 As a corollary to their desire to provide both profitability 
and positive externalities, social entrepreneurs have also embraced 
attempts to engage in a more accurate accounting of the holistic effects of 
their businesses.192 Where traditional business associations merely measure 
their assets against their liabilities in determining profitability, social 
entrepreneurs have attempted to price the value of their social and 
environmental externalities into their financial reporting.193 In this way, 
the true impact of business associations on market failures is directly 
known to the board of directors, shareholders, and society at large, who 
can then structure their consumer and investment decisions based upon a 
more robust theory of corporate accounting.194 
A new generation of “hybrid corporations” has been passed into law 
in a number of states, and the most recent addition to this class of business 
associations is the benefit corporation. This Note will now analyze the rise 
of the benefit corporation,195 a hybridized corporate entity that mandates 
both the pursuit of profit and material contribution to the public good, as 
a possible solution to the quagmire of shareholder wealth maximization 
and sustainable development.196 While the benefit corporation is not the 
only attempt at constructing a legal form for blended enterprise, this 
Note will not attempt to discuss the various benefits and deficiencies of 
other new hybrid entities like the low-profit limited liability company197 
and the flexible purpose corporation.198 Instead, this Note will focus on 
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how to ensure that benefit corporations can fulfill their stated dual-
purpose aspirations. 
B. The Benefit Corporation: Allowing Private Firms to Take Back 
Responsibility 
Although it came from humble beginnings as a project of the non-
profit organization B Lab,199 the benefit corporation has surged to the 
forefront of cutting-edge corporate legal theory. Within the last two years, 
benefit corporation legislation has been signed into law in California,200 
Hawaii,201 Maryland,202 New Jersey,203 New York,204 Vermont,205 and 
Virginia.206 Benefit corporation legislation has been introduced in five 
additional states,207 and several more legislative proposals are expected to 
be introduced this year.208 It is worth noting that benefit corporations have 
been approved by state legislatures in unanimous and bipartisan votes209 
and have received a great deal of positive media attention.210 Businesses 
have also been highly receptive to the benefit corporation model, and not 
just small, traditionally non-profit entities. Patagonia, the well-known 
clothing manufacturer, which had over $270 million in revenues in 2011, 
was one of the first twelve businesses to incorporate under the benefit 
corporation statute in California.211 
Benefit corporations are dual purpose, blended entities, adhering to 
the mold of Dodd’s social enterprise theory and the social 
entrepreneurship movement, with a legal structure that embraces both the 
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pursuit of profit and the material enhancement of the public good.212 This 
general legal structure provides a benefit corporation with two distinct 
advantages over non-profits and traditional corporate entities. First, 
unlike non-profits, the board of directors may issue dividend payments to 
shareholders.213 Escaping the non-distribution constraint is essential to 
accessing sufficient financing to compete with traditional corporate 
entities, while also attracting management talent who desire wealth.214 
Second, the benefit corporation also possesses an affirmative statutory 
mandate to pursue the general public benefit, in addition to any specific 
public benefits included within the articles of incorporation.215 This 
enables benefit corporations to transcend the efforts of corporate social 
responsibility because they are manifestly enabled to construct positive 
externalities. 
The express statutory purpose of the benefit corporation is to 
distance itself from the shareholder wealth maximization norm that has 
dominated traditional corporations, to increase transparency in corporate 
decisionmaking, and to increase accountability for promised social 
outcomes.216 To accomplish these three distinct goals, the statutory 
language mandates several critical changes to the corporate legal structure. 
First, the corporate entity has the express purpose of creating a “material 
positive impact on society and the environment.”217 Second, a benefit 
corporation is required to publish an “annual benefit report” that details 
the corporation’s “overall social and environmental performance” using 
an independent, third-party standard of valumetrics.218 Third, the board 
of directors is assigned an expanded fiduciary duty that requires 
consideration of interests in addition to the financial interests of its 
shareholders219 during the process of corporate decisionmaking. Each of 
these alterations shall be considered using the California version of the 
legislation as a template.220 
 1. Public and Private Purposes of the Benefit Corporation 
The statutory language that creates benefit corporations provides 
that the purpose of the benefit corporation is to create “general public 
benefit,”221 in addition to any “specific public benefit”222 that the articles of 
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incorporation are drafted223 or amended224 to include. The legislation 
provides a non-exhaustive list of potential specific public benefits 
including: providing low-income or underserved individuals or 
communities with beneficial products or services, promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in 
the ordinary course of business, preserving the environment, improving 
human health, promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of 
knowledge, increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit 
purpose, and accomplishing any other particular benefit for society or 
the environment.225 In other words, the benefit corporation permits the 
construction of some of the most undersupplied positive externalities in 
our system of liberal capitalism.  
The breadth of the scope of the specific public benefits would allow 
most large, publicly held entities to function as benefit corporations, such 
as Apple (advancement of the sciences), Google (advancement of 
knowledge), or Paramount Studios (advancement of the arts). The 
articulation of a specific public benefit, however, cannot replace the 
requirement of the general public benefit.226 This is to prevent a 
hypothetical company from advancing science, but doing so, for instance, 
through the exploitation of child labor.227 General public benefit is defined 
as a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”228 What constitutes a “material 
positive impact” is left undefined, but it is rather clearly a function of the 
third-party standard.229 
The third-party standard is a “standard for defining, reporting, and 
assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance,” with 
strict qualification standards that define which external entities can 
develop a valumetric standard for the benefit corporation.230 Specifically, 
the third-party standard must be constructed by a wholly independent 
entity that has “no material financial relationship with the benefit 
corporation” and is not “materially financed” by other companies 
operating within the specific industry of the benefit corporation. 
Substantively, the third-party standard must be a “comprehensive 
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assessment” of the considerations mandated by the expanded fiduciary 
duties of the board of directors231 and must apply a “balanced 
multistakeholder approach.”232 As Clark and Babson note, unlike “in the 
financial area, where standardized conventions for reporting financial 
performance have developed, there does not yet exist a standard way to 
report on social and environmental performance.”233 That being said, 
there are purportedly a wide variety of third-party standard-setting 
organizations that meet the substantive and conflict of interest 
qualifications set forth in the statute.234 Moreover, there is a “public 
comment period,” in which members of the general public may provide 
suggestions for how to develop the standard.235 The ultimate third-party 
standard adopted must remain “publicly available” and include the 
“criteria considered,” the “relative weightings assigned to the criteria,” 
the identities of the directors, officers and third-party standardmaker, the 
process by which revisions are made, and an “accounting of the sources 
of financial support for the entity.”236 
 2. Auditing and Reporting Requirements 
The second critical innovation of the benefit corporation is the 
requirement of publication of an “annual benefit report.”237 The annual 
benefit report, prepared by the board of directors and in the board’s 
opinion, must state whether the benefit corporation “failed to pursue its 
general, and any specific, public benefit purpose in all material respects” in 
light of its third-party standard.238 If so, the board must specify how it 
failed.239 Furthermore, the annual benefit report must include the “process 
and rationale for selecting the third-party standard,” “the ways in which 
the benefit corporation pursued any specific public benefit,” and “any 
circumstances that have hindered the creation” of any general or specific 
public benefit in a “narrative” format.240 What is most critical about the 
provisions of the annual benefit report, however, is that the ultimate 
assessment of the social and environmental impact of the benefit 
corporation, via the third-party standard, is not an externally applied 
 
 231. Id. § 14601(g)(1) (referencing Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2)–(5), which sets out a non-
exclusive list of non-shareholder interests that must be considered by the board of directors). 
 232. Id. § 14601(g)(3). 
 233. Clark & Babson, supra note 99, at 842. 
 234. Id. at 845–47 (discussing the apparent efficacy of third-party standard-setting organizations 
such as The Global Reporting Initiative, GreenSeal, Underwriters Laboratories, ISO2600, Green 
America, and B Lab, among others). 
 235. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(3)(B). 
 236. Id. § 14601(g)(4)(A)–(E). 
 237. Id. §§ 14621, 14630. 
 238. Id. § 14621(a). 
 239. Id. § 14621(b). 
 240. Id. § 14630. 
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auditing mechanism.241 Instead, the benefit corporation, through the board 
of directors, must apply the standard to itself.242 Whether the self-
application of third-party valumetrics will be successful in curtailing the 
traditional excesses of profit maximization is a separate question, discussed 
below.243 
3. The Directorate's Procedural Duty of Consideration of  
Non-Shareholder Interests 
The third innovation of the benefit corporation is the expansion of 
directors’ and managers’ fiduciary duties to affirmatively mandate the 
consideration of non-shareholder interests during the process of corporate 
decisionmaking.244 The statutory text provides an exhaustive list of parties 
and issues to be considered, including: the shareholders, the employees 
and workforce of the benefit corporation and its subsidiaries and supplies, 
customers, communities and societal considerations, the local and global 
environment, the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit 
corporation, and the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its 
general, and any, specific public benefit purpose.245 The duty of 
consideration in section 14620(b), however, is expressly limited by section 
14622(a) to persons with discretion to act and only in situations in which 
it “reasonably appears to the officer that the matter may have a material 
effect” on the creation of a general or specific public benefit or any of the 
constituents noted in 14620(b).246 
 4. Benefit Enforcement Proceedings 
Finally, benefit corporations provide an express private right of action 
called a “benefit enforcement proceeding” that permits shareholders and 
(minority) directors to sue (majority) directors and the corporation for a 
host of breaches of the obligations set forth above.247 Specifically, the 
benefit enforcement proceeding permits suit upon: a failure to pursue the 
general, or any specific, public benefit purpose of the benefit corporation, 
a violation of a duty or standard of conduct imposed on a director, and a 
failure to deliver or post the annual benefit report.248 As stated above, in 
the context of the board of directors’ duty to consider non-shareholder 
interests, suit cannot be brought upon actions with an immaterial effect, 
significantly cabining liability for directors in the exercise of their 
 
 241. Id. § 14630(a)(2) (“The assessment does not need to be audited or certified by a third party.”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. See supra Part II.B. 
 244. Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b). 
 245. Id. § 14620(b)(1)–(7). 
 246. Id. §§ 14620(b), 14622. 
 247. Id. § 14601(b). 
 248. Id. § 14601(b)(1)–(3). 
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discretion of the day-to-day operations of the firm.249 Moreover, there are 
a host of director immunity provisions built into the statute that prevent 
the imposition of monetary damages for breaches of their fiduciary duties, 
as well as a denial of standing to “third-party beneficiaries,”—that is, non-
corporate actors—in benefit enforcement proceedings.250 The benefit 
enforcement proceeding, however, is essential to maintaining the dual 
purpose of the benefit corporation, for reasons that are further detailed 
below. 
C. Criticisms of the Benefit Corporation’s Efficacy 
To be sure, the benefit corporation regime cannot be expected to 
single-handedly correct for the problems of firm externalities and ensure 
immediate sustainable development, primarily because of the voluntary 
nature of benefit incorporation251 and the lack of strong tax incentives that 
have driven other innovative corporate models in the past.252 However, the 
framework of the benefit corporation provides the beginnings of a future 
regime of corporate social responsibility in which internal and preventative 
enforcement mechanisms—unlike consumer boycotts, non-shareholder 
litigation, and non-profit organizations—are relied upon to prevent 
negative externalities and provide positive externalities. Moreover, as 
more benefit corporations enter the marketplace, there is significant 
potential for “market-driven positive feedback loops [that reward] 
companies that adopt this higher standard of corporate governance and 
demonstrate higher levels of overall social and environmental 
performance.”253 
Beyond the problem of disseminating the benefit corporation as a 
widespread corporate form, the primary concern revolves around 
enforcing the substantive purpose of benefit corporations.254 Existing legal 
scholarship on the benefit corporation has focused on the first two prongs 
of its structural innovations, particularly the application and enforcement 
of the third-party standard in the annual benefit report and this rule’s 
potentially drastic shortcomings.255 Because the third-party standard is 
applied by the benefit corporation to its own actions (and not by the 
third party that developed the standard), commentators contend that the 
board of directors will ultimately fall victim to profit maximization and 
shirking.256 In conjunction with the business judgment rule, upon judicial 
 
 249. Id. § 14622. 
 250. Id. § 14622(c), (d). 
 251. Id. §14601(a). 
 252. See Munch, supra note 119, at 188.  
 253. Clark & Babson, supra note 99, at 845. 
 254. E.g., Reiser, supra note 190, at 591; Munch, supra note 119, at 170.  
 255. Reiser, supra note 190, at 613; Munch, supra note 119, at 189–94. 
 256. Reiser, supra note 190, at 611–14. 
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review, boards of directors are unlikely to be controlled effectively by the 
substantive components of the statute, at least standing alone.257 The 
substantive goal of the benefit corporation, to effect a “material positive 
impact on society and the environment,”258 is certainly admirable, but is 
subject to the same “creative accounting” and lax oversight that plague 
traditional corporate entities—especially in a future, competitive 
marketplace of benefit corporations. Non-shareholders may be left with 
the same kind of “greenwashing” that has plagued traditional notions of 
corporate social responsibility.259 
This enforcement problem is compounded by the fact that benefit 
corporation statutes do not provide any hierarchy of purpose between 
profit seeking and provision of the public good.260 The board of directors 
is thus left with tremendous discretion as to what particular outcomes to 
follow, and a host of immunity provisions that prevent monetary liability 
for a failure to succeed in the dual purpose of the entity.261 Moreover, as 
stated above, third-party beneficiaries of the benefit corporation have no 
standing to sue the board of directors for the failure to provide or 
continue to provide positive externalities.262 The question is rightly posed: 
How does the benefit corporation intend to succeed in light of these 
potentially fatal structural deficiencies? This Note concurs with criticisms 
that the benefit corporation will fail to maintain its dual purpose, but 
only if enforcement actions remain purely substantive in nature. The true 
strength of the benefit corporation, however, lies in enforcing the as-yet 
undeveloped notion of the procedural duty of consideration of non-
shareholder interests imposed on the board of directors by the statutes.263 
III.  Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect 
Non-Shareholder Interests 
With the observations and criticisms set forth in Part II in mind, this 
Note will now propose the possibility of enforcing the fiduciary duty of 
consideration held by the board of directors and its officers during 
corporate decisionmaking from a procedural perspective. 
 
 257. Id. at 613–14. 
 258. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601 (West 2012). 
 259. Reiser, supra note 190, at 611. 
 260. Id. at 612–13. 
 261. Cal. Corp. Code § 14622(c), (d). 
 262. Reiser, supra note 190, at 611–14. 
 263. Another proposal for preventing a collapse of substantive enforcement comes from the 
drafter of the legislation himself. Clark suggests that because the shareholders remain free to remove 
problematic directors, they can simply oust directors who do not properly subscribe to the dual 
purpose of the benefit corporation. Clark & Babson, supra note 99, at 850. While that is true, it is 
highly problematic because the shareholders could just as easily elect a board of directors who are 
unsympathetic to the benefit corporation’s dual purpose. 
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A. Enforcing the Board of Directors’ Procedural Duty of 
Consideration in a Benefit Enforcement Proceeding 
Current analysis of the duty of consideration has been confined to 
judicial review of substantive decisions made by the board of directors.264 
For instance, if the directorate makes a particular business decision that 
ultimately harms the provision of public benefit, shareholders and 
(minority) directors could file suit under the express private right of 
action set forth by the benefit enforcement proceeding.265 The problem is 
that such an outcome is governed by the business judgment rule, which 
creates a strong presumption that the board of directors acted in the best 
interests of the corporation266 and would probably result in dismissal 
under current summary judgment standards, if not at the pleading 
stage.267 This is especially true in light of both the aforementioned lack of 
a hierarchy between profit-seeking and public benefit-creating actions, 
which affords the board of directors a great deal of discretion, and the 
substantial director immunity provisions that undermine a strong 
deterrence regime.268 Current analysis has also focused on the procedural 
duty of filing an annual benefit report, in which the board of directors 
self-applies a third-party standard to determine the overall success of the 
benefit corporation at fulfilling its hybrid purpose.269 Short of failing to 
file the annual benefit report and abiding by its specific content 
directives, there is little room for the board of directors to be subject to 
injunctive remedy.270 This Note contends, however, that there is an 
additional procedural duty lurking beneath the surface of the benefit 
corporation statute. 
Section 14620(b), which details the requirements of the duty of 
consideration, is actionable from the perspective of substantive outcomes 
or the procedural filing of an annual benefit report. As a matter of 
litigation strategy, section 14620(b) also functionally mandates a board of 
directors—subject to suit in a benefit enforcement proceeding—to 
procedurally demonstrate their consideration of non-shareholder interests 
in a material corporate decision. In this way, each material action by the 
board of directors is capable of both substantive and procedural review. 
Substantive, in that a lawsuit may challenge a particular business decision 
 
 264. Reiser, supra note 190, at 611–14. 
 265. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b). 
 266. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52–53 (Del. 2006); see Hamilton, supra 
note 62, at 638–738. 
 267. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
 268. Cal. Corp. Code § 14622(c); Reiser, supra note 190, at 612–13. 
 269. Munch, supra note 119, at 186. 
 270. Clark & Babson, supra note 99, at 842–46. 
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under the business judgment rule, and procedural, in the sense that the 
board of directors must make some affirmative, evidentiary showing of 
non-shareholder consideration for all material decisions when challenged 
in a benefit enforcement proceeding. This is the heart of the enforcement 
power in the benefit corporation statute because it completely escapes 
the deference of the business judgment rule. Instead, there is strict 
procedural liability, subject to injunctive remedy, to present evidence of 
consideration by the board of directors regarding a material decision. 
Without that evidence, the plaintiffs in a benefit enforcement proceeding 
should be able to restrain further corporate action until a sufficient 
procedural showing of consideration is made by the board of directors. 
Some might argue that this procedural enforcement mechanism is a 
hollow hope because in no way is it action forcing, apart from requiring 
the board of directors to make a showing of procedural consideration 
upon suit. An existing procedural enforcement mechanism in an entirely 
different context, however, demonstrates how powerful a procedural 
showing can be. 
B. Using the National Environmental Protection Act as a 
Template for Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration 
in Benefit Corporations 
The National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) provides an 
excellent template from which to understand the value of a procedural 
enforcement mechanism. NEPA was enacted by Congress in 1970 and is 
widely considered a landmark environmental law.271 While NEPA 
proclaims the broad purpose of requiring the federal government to “use 
all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,”272 its “most 
important provision”273 regards “environmental impact statements” 
(“EIS”). Pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, all agencies of the 
federal government must “include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement.”274 
This detailed statement must contain assessments of “(i) the environmental 
impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects . . . , 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) . . . [consequences for] long-
term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments 
of resources.”275 
 
 271. Daniel A. Farber et al., Cases and Materials on Environmental Law 456 (8th ed. 2010). 
 272. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012). 
 273. Farber, supra note 271, at 456. 
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
 275. Id. 
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Unlike other federal environmental statutes like the Endangered 
Species Act276 or the Clean Air Act,277 NEPA is unique in that it has “no 
action-forcing mechanisms beyond the simple EIS filing requirement.”278 
In other words, no substantive outcome is required of federal actors by 
NEPA as a result of considering their proposed action’s environmental 
impact; it merely requires the procedural consideration of its 
environmental impact, as evidenced by an EIS filing. Although this 
“merely procedural”279 duty may sound like a weak enforcement 
mechanism for mitigating environmental harms, “NEPA has had a 
significant impact:”280 
First, the need to comply with the EIS requirement required agencies 
to reconsider their missions in light of the environmental impacts those 
missions caused. Second, . . . the possibility of challenging a project 
because the agency failed to do an EIS, or because it produced an 
insufficient one, provides environmental groups some leverage to insist 
on mitigation as the price for settling NEPA lawsuits. . . . Finally, 
NEPA litigation serves as an information-disclosure and political-
rallying mechanism, which can help to generate political opposition to 
projects with negative environmental impacts.281 
In sum, the EIS, as a procedural enforcement mechanism of NEPA, has 
the effect of: (1) increasing actor knowledge, (2) providing litigation 
leverage for affected parties, and (3) increasing public knowledge and 
organized responses to proposed action. To that extent, NEPA’s 
procedural duty is in fact “action-forcing” of substantive outcomes, as 
least passively. This procedural result has been described as “the 
democratizing effect” because it increases plaintiff participation in the 
decisionmaking processes of federal actors.282 
This Note contends that we can extract a similar effect from the 
statutory language of the benefit corporation to ensure a greater degree 
of substantive enforcement from the procedural prong of the duty of 
consideration held by the board of directors. Through strategic use of 
benefit enforcement proceedings, shareholders and (minority) directors 
should require the board of directors to procedurally evidence its 
consideration of non-shareholder interests. In doing so, shareholders and 
(minority) directors can attain the same effects on benefit corporations 
that NEPA has on federal actors. Although it is certainly true that the 
benefit corporation statute makes no reference to the construction of a 
“corporate impact statement” analogous to an EIS, the plain meaning of 
 
 276. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). 
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the statutory language would require a similar, albeit more informal, 
showing upon suit. In this way, the burden of the procedural showing is 
deferred to the benefit enforcement proceeding, unlike federal actors 
under NEPA, who must prepare an EIS in advance of any “major 
Federal action.”283 That said, if upon suit the board of directors cannot 
evidence its consideration of non-shareholder interests, it will be subject 
to temporary injunction. In this way, benefit enforcement proceedings 
would closely track NEPA procedural litigation.284 
This Note argues that if plaintiffs and courts use this proposal as a 
litigation strategy and matter of statutory construction, they can construct 
a highly effective, albeit informal, deterrence regime against the board of 
directors and also give full weight to the legislative intent behind the 
statute in effectuating a dual-purpose enterprise. The deterrence regime 
created by this procedural enforcement mechanism is essential because 
of the host of director immunity provisions listed in section 14620 that 
effectively destroy any other source of deterrence to the board of 
directors, the nexus of power within any corporate entity.285 In tracking 
NEPA procedural litigation, this proposal would have three additional 
implications: (1) boards of directors would be necessarily exposed to the 
truth of what their actions will affect; (2) by increasing their knowledge 
exposure, like NEPA does for federal actors, boards would ultimately alter 
their decisionmaking processes to effect substantive changes in benefit to 
the public; and (3) shareholder-plaintiffs would have significant settlement 
leverage against a misbehaving benefit corporation.286 In this way, benefit 
enforcement proceedings could obtain the same “democratizing effect” 
from benefit corporation statutes as citizen-suits do under NEPA.287 This 
Note’s litigation strategy could save the benefit corporation from itself. 
C. Responses to Anticipated Criticisms of the Proposed  Procedural 
Litigation Strategy 
There are two primary criticisms that could be leveled at this Note's 
proposal. First, rigorous use of benefit enforcement proceedings would 
destroy benefit corporations through excessive litigation. Second, benefit 
corporation shareholders have little incentive to undermine their own 
equity investment by litigating against the benefit corporation, and 
therefore no one will initiate such enforcement suits in practice. Each 
criticism shall be addressed in turn. 
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Critics could contend that the costs of business would skyrocket for 
benefit corporations as a result of constant litigation demanding a 
procedural showing of consideration of non-shareholder interests by the 
board of directors. Thus, this Note’s proposal would place the benefit 
corporation at a competitive disadvantage to traditional corporations, 
which do not have a similar procedural liability. I believe that there are 
at least four checks against this concern that, in the aggregate, more than 
effectively hedge against serious disadvantage. First, the lack of third-
party beneficiary standing for plaintiffs in a benefit enforcement 
proceeding severely cabins the number of potential adversaries.288 Second, 
the director immunity provisions of the benefit corporation statutes limit 
all actions, substantive or procedural, to review of “material” corporate 
decisions.289 This limitation on the kinds of directorate action that are 
subject to suit would filter out trivial or vexatious litigation regarding day-
to-day operations by the board of directors at the pleading stage. Third, 
traditional civil pleading requirements would require the plaintiffs to 
make some affirmative, factual showing of non-consideration of non-
shareholder interests in the complaint.290 For instance, these procedural 
actions would not be able to proceed past the pleading stage unless they 
set forth an affidavit in the complaint that stated more than neutral facts 
with regard to non-consideration by the board of directors. Fourth, the fact 
that shareholders and (minority) directors are the only parties with 
standing means that the plaintiffs and defendants in a benefit enforcement 
proceeding would have aligned interests—the continued success of the 
benefit corporation as an equity investment. Therefore, plaintiffs in a 
benefit enforcement proceeding would rarely have the intended goal of 
destroying the benefit corporation through injunctive remedies or costly 
settlement negotiations. 
Critics could also argue that while the proposed litigation strategy is 
good in theory, in practice it will never happen, precisely because 
shareholder interests are monetarily aligned with the board of directors. 
The directors are dependent on the board for their salaries, and they 
might have stock incentives that further align their interests with those of 
the shareholders. This argument is also a direct offshoot of the 
aforementioned criticism of the lack of standing in benefit enforcement 
proceedings for third-party beneficiaries. I would respond that, as long as 
benefit incorporation remains voluntary, benefit corporations will attract 
investors who believe in the concept of “shareholder responsibility.”291 
Indeed, all that the proposed litigation strategy requires is a single 
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activist shareholder to file suit. In that world, it remains highly likely that 
at least one shareholder would be willing to engage in a benefit 
enforcement proceeding against the board of directors out of concern for 
both her long-term investment and the provision of positive externalities. 
Conclusion 
Liberal-capitalist societies like the United States have reached an 
inflection point. The traditional system of correcting for market failures 
by applying external corrective mechanisms has failed to solve the most 
challenging social and environmental externalities presented by the 
conduct of corporate firms. Non-profit organizations, corporate social 
responsibility initiatives, the government, and consumers can only do so 
much to shoulder the burden of positive externalities given their respective 
limitations. Once advocates for social change acknowledge that external 
remedies for market failures are less efficient and effective than internal, 
structural reforms, the benefit corporation will stand out as the best 
solution to the market’s ills. 
As commentators have noted, the benefit corporation’s substantive 
enforcement mechanism, the self-application of a third-party standard 
and its procedural enforcement mechanism—publishing the results in an 
annual benefit report—are alone insufficient to guarantee fulfillment of 
the aspirational, dual purpose of the entity. But, if shareholder-plaintiffs 
apply the litigation strategy set forth in this Note’s proposal—to require 
a procedural showing of consideration of non-shareholder interest under 
penalty of injunction—they will create a self-sustaining deterrence 
regime against shirking the duty to provide public benefit. While this may 
raise efficiency and cost concerns, for the reasons set forth above there is 
little reason to believe that the increased litigation costs would ever 
become damning to the benefit corporation as a competitive enterprise. 
Let us briefly return to the cautionary tale of Apple and Foxconn. 
According to a former Apple executive, noncompliance with corporate 
social responsibility “is tolerated, as long as the suppliers promise to try 
harder next time. If we meant business, core violations would 
disappear.”292 As this Note has demonstrated, this understanding of the 
problems plaguing traditional corporations probably exists in good faith, 
but it misses the mark. Without a structural reformation of the descriptive 
and normative foundations of the corporate entity, engagement with 
internal codes of conduct and external auditors will ultimately fall short. If 
Apple truly wants to avoid the negative externalities that it has 
encountered in its global supply chain, it should reincorporate as a 
benefit corporation. In this way, major American corporations can create 
a system of sustainable capitalism that means business. 
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